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The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar
* 
 
This  paper  examines  the  direct  private  equity  investment  strategies  across 
sovereign  wealth  funds  and  their  relationship  to  the  funds’  organizational 
structures. SWFs seem to engage in a form of trend chasing, since they are more 
likely to invest at home when domestic equity prices are higher, and invest abroad 
when foreign prices are higher. Funds see the industry P/E ratios of their home 
investments  drop  in  the  year  after  the  investment,  while  they  have  a  positive 
change in the year after their investments abroad. SWFs where politicians are 
involved have a much greater likelihood of investing at home than those where 
external managers are involved. At the same time, SWFs with external managers 
tend to invest in lower P/E industries, which see an increase in the P/E ratios in 
the year after the investment. By way of contrast, funds with politicians involved 
invest in higher P/E industries, which have a negative valuation change in the 
year after the investment. 
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1. Introduction 
The  role  of  sovereign  wealth  funds  (SWFs)  in  the  global  financial  system  has  been 
increasingly recognized in recent years. The resources controlled by these funds—estimated to 
be $3.5 trillion in 2008 (Fernandez and Eschweiler [2008])—have grown sharply over the past 
decade. Projections, while inherently tentative due to the uncertainties about the future path of 
economic growth and commodity prices, suggest that they will be increasingly important actors 
in the years to come. 
 
Despite this significant and growing role, financial economists have devoted remarkably 
little attention to these funds. While the investment behavior of financial institutions with less 
capital under management, such as hedge and private equity funds, have been scrutinized in 
hundreds of articles, only a handful of pieces have sought to understand sovereign funds. The 
lack of scrutiny must be largely attributed to the deliberately low profile adopted by many SWFs, 
which makes systematic analysis challenging.   
 
In this paper, we analyze whether there exist differences in investment strategies  and 
performance across sovereign wealth funds, focusing on their direct private equity investments.  
Since  it  is  generally  believed  that  the  private  equity  market  is  characterized  by  greater 
information asymmetries than public markets, differences among institutions should be most 
pronounced here. Moreover, it is one of the few dimensions of these funds’ investments that we 
can obtain systematic information on. We analyze how SWFs vary in their investment styles and 
performance across various geographies and governance structures. 
   3 
 
After merging three publicly available investment databases, Dealogic’s M&A Analytics, 
Security Data Company’s (SDC) Platinum M&A, and Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr, we identify 
2662 investments between 1984 and 2007 by 29 SWFs, including acquisitions, venture capital 
and private equity investments, and structured minority purchases in public entities. We examine 
the  propensity  of  funds  to  invest  domestically,  the  equity  price  levels  at  the  time  of  their 




We find several interesting patterns in the data: 
  SWFs are more likely to invest at home when domestic equity prices are higher, and 
more likely to invest abroad when foreign prices are higher. 
  On average, funds invest at significantly lower price-earnings (P/E) ratios when investing 
at home and higher P/E levels outside. This result is mainly driven by Asian and Mid-
Eastern funds, while the opposite holds for Western funds. 
  Asian groups and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Middle Eastern SWFs, see the industry 
P/E ratios of their home investments drop in the year after the investment, while they see 
a positive change in the year after their investments abroad. 
  SWFs where politicians are involved in governance have a much greater likelihood of 
investing at home, while those relying upon external managers display a lower likelihood. 
                                                           
1 Because many of the target firms in the sample are private, we examine the weighted average of 
the price-earnings ratio of firms in the same industry, country, and year. 
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  Once we control for the differing propensity to invest domestically, SWFs with external 
managers tend to invest in lower P/E industries, while those with politicians involved in 
the governance process invest in higher P/E industries. 
  Investments by SWFs with the involvement of external managers tend to be associated a 
more positive change in industry P/E in the year after the deal, while for funds where 
politicians are involved, the trend goes the other way round. 
 
Taken as a whole, two competing interpretations can be offered for these results. It may 
be that funds investing more heavily in their domestic markets, particularly those with the active 
involvement of political leaders, are more sensitive to the social needs of the nation. As a result, 
they might be willing to accept investments which have high social returns but low private ones. 
Since the social returns are not easily observable to us, it would appear that these funds are 
investing in industries with lower performance. The alternative interpretation would suggest that 
greater investment at home is a symptom of poor investment decisions, since the funds are prone 
to home bias or else to have decisions distorted by political or agency considerations. 
 
It is difficult, however, to reconcile the first view with some of the results. In particular, it 
is  hard  to  understand  why  economic  development  needs  would  compel  firms  to  invest 
domestically when equity prices are relatively higher, which presumably should be a time when 
capital constraints are less limiting. Similar, it is hard to explain why social welfare concerns 
would  lead  politician-influenced  funds  would  led  to  invest  in  the  highest  P/E  industries, 
especially in light of the negative returns that subsequently characterize these sectors. While 5 
 
these results are only suggestive given the preliminary nature of the data, they raise a number of 
important questions about the investment strategies and management structures of SWFs.  
 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the second section, we review relevant theoretical 
perspectives and the earlier studies on SWFs. Our data sources and construction are described in 
Section 3.  Section 4 presents the analysis. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives and Earlier Work 
Numerous accounts by both objective observers and practitioners suggest that there is 
substantial variation in the investment criteria and sophistication of institutional investors. In 
particular, practitioner accounts suggest (e.g., Swensen [2009]), institutions often rely on overly 
rigid decision criteria or lack a sufficient understanding of key asset classes.  Observers attribute 
these failures to underlying factors such as inappropriate incentives—for example, the limited 
compensation and autonomy that investment officers enjoy, which leads to frequent turnover, 
and a predilection to select ―safe‖ investments even if the expected returns are modest—and 
conflicting objectives, particularly the pressures by fund overseers to invest in projects sponsored 
by  local  entrepreneurs,  even  if  the  expected  investment  returns  (and  in  some  cases,  social 
benefits) are modest.   
 
Recent papers by Gompers and Metrick [2001] and Lerner, et al. [2007] have highlighted 
the enormous heterogeneity in investment strategies and ultimately returns across different types 
of institutional investors. However, the evidence on SWFs is limited thus far due to many data 
restrictions. In addition, SWFs are unique institutions: while these funds manage very large pools 6 
 
of capital, their objective functions are often quite complex and do not only focus on financial 
returns alone. On the one hand, sovereign funds face political pressures to further short-term and 
local goals, as suggested in Shleifer and Vishny [1994]: e.g., to invest in local companies, rather 
than saving for the long term.  On the other hand, as nations become wealthier, their ability to 
invest in government institutions grows. Moreover, citizens and businesses are likely to demand 
better governmental services. As a result, nations with more wealth per citizen should have better 
governance of their SWFs and a greater ability to use SWFs to further long term investment goals, 
rather than being captured by government institutions. 
  
A more focused body of work has looked at the rationales for and against state-owned 
banks. These arguments concerning the involvement of the government in the financial sector 
can  also  be  relevant  for  the  role  of  SWFs  in  an  economy.  Three  alternative  theories  have 
attracted wide currency: 
  The development perspective suggests that governments collect savings and direct them 
toward strategic long term projects, overcoming market failures and generating aggregate 
demand and foster growth. Hence state owned banks, unlike private banks, maximize 
broader social objectives rather than just profits (Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980]; Stiglitz 
[1993]).  
  The political perspective argues that politicians are self-interested individuals who pursue 
their  own  goals,  and  hence  state-owned  banks  enable  governments  to  finance  the 
inefficient but politically desired projects, such as maximizing employment or financing 
favored enterprises (Shleifer and Vishny [1994]).  7 
 
  The agency perspective argues, like the development perspective, that state owned banks 
are created to maximize social welfare, but can generate corruption and misallocation 
(Banerjee [1997]; Hart, et al. [1997]). The agency costs within government bureaucracies 
can result in weak managerial incentives (Tirole [1994]). Under this view, state-owned 
banks channel resources to socially profitable activities, but public managers exert less 
effort (for instance, by diverting resources to advance personal ends or by taking steps to 
facilitate obtaining future private sector jobs) than would their private counterparts.  
 
Finally, a more recent literature looks specifically at sovereign wealth funds. Fotak, et al. 
[2008] considers the financial impact of SWF investments in listed companies around the world. 
They  collect  data  from  Securities  Data  Company  (SDC),  direct  disclosures  of  SWFs,  and 
financial press. Their final sample contains of 75 investments in public firms by 16 SWFs in the 
years 1989 to 2008. While they find an average abnormal return of +1% for targets on the day in 
which the SWF investments are announced, over two years after the transaction, the abnormal 
buy-and-hold returns average -41%. They find that this effect is not related to the size of equity 
stake purchased by the SWF, and also does not differ across the various SWFs. They interpret 
the results as indicative of the additional agency costs that the SWF impose on the companies 
and cause with a deterioration of performance.  
 
Le Borgne and Medas [2008] consider specifically SWFs in the Pacific island countries, 
which are typically used to dampen the volatility of public revenues. While systematic data are 
not available, the authors briefly describe the spending rules used by the governments, and the 
funds’ governance structures. They suggest that the poor performance of these funds in achieving 8 
 
their goals is related to the weakness of public financial management systems and the lack of 
spending controls. In some cases, the rigid operational rules of the funds hindered their ability to 
alleviate  revenue  volatility.    In  other  instances,  the  SWFs  focused  on  achieving  ambitious 
financial returns, which led in some cases to risky investment profiles, mismanagement, and 
substantial losses in assets.  
 
3. Data Sources and Construction  
To analyze the direct investment strategies of SWFs, we combine three sets of data: 
information  on  the  SWFs  themselves,  the  direct  investments  that  the  funds  made,  and  the 
investment climate around the time of the transaction. The data for all the three components are 
been drawn from publicly available sources.  
 
SWF sample construction:  We start with a preliminary sample of SWFs by combining 
the profiles of the funds published by JPMorgan (Fernandez and Eschweiler [2008]) and Preqin 
(Friedman [2008]). In the cases where the two databases use different names for the same SWF, 
we employ the fund address and related information to eliminate duplicates. We add five funds 
to the sample that were not included in these two compilations but are frequently described as 
SWFs  in  at  least  one  of  the  investment  datasets  noted  below.  This  initial  search  yields  a 
population of 69 institutions, including some SWFs that have been announced but are not yet 
active.  
 
We then merge this initial sample of funds with the available data on direct investments 
and characteristics of SWFs. We are careful to extract investment data for both the SWFs and 9 
 
their ―subsidiaries,‖ which we define as entities in which SWF has at least a 50% ownership 
stake.  The  two  SWF  directories  and  the  investment  datasets  noted  below  did  not  always 
explicitly note the links between SWFs and their subsidiaries. To extract transactions involving 
SWF subsidiaries, we supplement our list of SWF subsidiaries by employing ownership data in 
the Directory of Corporate Affiliations and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis.  
 
SWF Characteristics: The fund profiles in the JPMorgan and Preqin databases contain 
information on the size and operations of the funds. If there was a discrepancy between the two 
databases, we reconfirm the accuracy of the information through web searches and newspaper 
articles. The key variables collected are: 
  Assets  under  Management—JPMorgan  and  Preqin  profiles  contain  estimates  of  fund 
sizes.  In  case  of  discrepancy,  JPMorgan’s  estimate  of  assets  under  management  was 
given preference. Preqin’s estimate of assets under management was used only when no 
JPMorgan estimate existed. 
  The Presence of Politicians in the Managing Bodies—The JPMorgan report emphasizes 
governance structures of funds. We form a dummy variable that indicates if a fund’s 
JPMorgan profile contains evidence of presence of politicians in the governance of the 
fund.  For  example,  Khazanah  Nasional’s  JPMorgan  profile  indicates  that  the  fund’s 
board  of  directors  ―has  an  eight-member  Board  comprising  representatives  from  the 
public and private sectors. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the Right Honorable Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, is the Chairman of the Board of Directors.‖ Similarly, the Alaska Permanent 
Reserve Fund’s profile indicates that the fund’s Board of Trustees ―is comprised of four 
public members, the Commissioner of Revenue and one additional cabinet member of the 10 
 
governor's choosing.‖ In other cases, the volume indicates that the governance of the fund 
is in the hands of a board consisting of investment professionals and/or outside business 
leaders.  
  Reliance on External Managers/Advisors—We create a dummy variable that is one if 
either of our sources contain evidence that the institution relies on external management 
or advisors. For example, the JPMorgan profile indicates that the Hong Kong Exchange 
Fund ―employs external fund managers to manage about one third of the Fund’s assets, 
including all of its equity portfolios and other specialized assets.‖ 
These measures, it must be acknowledged, have important limitations. First, these are reported as 
of 2008: we do not have a time series on the governance of or advisor usage by the funds. 
Second,  these  measures  are  extremely  crude  characterizations  of  the  SWFs’  organizational 
structures. 
 
Investment  Data:  Information  regarding  SWF  target  investments  is  identified  in 
Dealogic’s M&A Analytics, SDC’s Platinum M&A, and Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr. All three of 
these  databases  compile  information  on  direct  investments  by  institutional  and  corporate 
investors. Transactions included in the database encompass outright acquisitions, venture capital 
and private equity investments, and structured minority purchases in public entities (frequently 
called PIPEs, or private investments in public entities). The databases do not include investments 
into  hedge,  mutual  or  private  equity  funds,  or  open  market  purchases  of  minority  stakes  in 
publicly-traded firms.  
 11 
 
For  each  of  the  three  datasets,  we  run  multiple  acquirer  name  keyword  searches 
individually for every fund in the sample. We also search for investments carried out by their 
subsidiaries.  Finally, text fields of acquirer descriptions are searched for phrases such as ―SWF,‖ 
―sovereign fund,‖ or ―sovereign wealth fund.‖ These additional transactions are examined, and if 
there is a match in the SWF’s identity (e.g., if there is a slight misspelling of the SWF’s name) 
and location, the entries are added to the database. The variables we obtain about each deal are 
the  announcement  date,  transaction  size,  share  of  the  equity  acquired,  and  the  country  and 
industry of the target. In the case of discrepancies across the databases, we use press accounts 
and web searches to resolve the differences. Some of the databases include proposed deals that 
were not consummated. If the transactions are described in the databases as ―withdrawn‖ or 
―rejected,‖ we drop them from the analysis. 
 
After merging the three databases, we are left with 2662 transactions between January 
1984 and December 2007 by 29 SWFs. We confirm that the bulk of the funds that are not 
included are either very new (indeed, some had not yet commenced operations by the end of 
2007) or very small. Of the 29 institutions with transactions in our sample, 24 are profiled in 
either the JPMorgan or Preqin volumes, or in both publications. There exist 23 JPMorgan and 16 
Preqin profiles for the funds in our sample.  
 
In the bulk of the analyses below, we also exclude 36 transactions where the targets were 
in Central America, South America, or Africa. This decision reflects  our desire to focus on 
investments in the major markets—i.e., Asian, Middle Eastern and Western countries (North 
America, Europe and Australia)—where the vast majority of the investments are concentrated. 12 
 
 
Environment  Data:  We  also  characterize  the  pricing  and  subsequent  returns  in  the 
industry and the nation of the transaction. Ideally, we would have liked to analyze deal pricing 
using the actual target firm’s P/E ratio. However, since most SWF’s investments are in private 
firms, these data are not available. 
 
Instead, we use: 
  Industry P/E ratios - To obtain a measure of deal valuations, we use the weighted average 
of the P/E ratios of firms in the target company’s industry and company headquarters 
nation. To calculate the P/E ratios for the target countries, we use the P/E ratios of public 
companies in the same industry and country  from the Datastream database, dropping 
companies with negative P/E ratios.  The main challenge was to get P/E ratios for Middle 
Eastern targets, particularly in the Persian Gulf region. In 73 cases, we could not compute 
a P/E ratio using the Datastream information. Weighted average P/E ratios were formed 
for each target investment at the country-industry-year level (using market values of the 
firms as weights).  We used industry classifications  based on the Standard Industrial 
Classification scheme
2 (for the distributions of investments by industries, see Table 1, 
Panel E). The distribution of P/E values was winsorized at the 5% and 95% level in order 
to  reduce  the  impact  of  extreme  observations.  We  also  construct  an  approximate 
performance measure for each deal: the change in the weighted mean industry-country 
P/E ratio in the year following the transaction.  
                                                           
2 We use a broader definition than the 2-digit SIC level since under this classification the number 
of companies per industry is very small in some target countries.  13 
 
  Home P/E and versus Outside P/E - To measure the P/E levels in the home nation versus 
outside the nation, we construct Home P/E and Outside P/E variables using the MSCI 
database  (downloaded  from  Datastream).  These  ratios  are  weighted  by  market 
capitalization and measured at the country-year level. We complete missing country-level 
P/E ratios using the Zawya database and Datastream’s P/E indexes for emerging markets. 
For investments made abroad, the variables Home P/E and Outside P/E correspond to the 
P/E  level  of  the  home  country  of  the  SWF  and  the  target  country,  respectively.  If 
investments are made at home, the Outside P/E variable equals the weighted average (by 
the total amount invested by SWFs over the sample period) P/E ratios of all countries in 
which investments were made by SWFs, excluding the home country. 
  
4. Analysis 
Table  1  presents  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  2662  transactions  made  by  the  29 
sovereign wealth funds in our sample. Panel A of Table 1 sorts the funds into three regions: Asia, 
Middle East,
3 and Western groups. The Western group includes funds from North America, 
Australia, and Europe. Our sample consists of seven funds in the Asian group, 15 funds in the 
Middle Eastern group, and seven funds in the Western group. The number of transactions of 
Asian  funds  (2046  observations)  is  substantially  larger  than  the  Middle  Eastern  group  (532 
observations) and the 84 observations of the Western group.  
 
One possible explanation for these differences in sample size is that we have only partial 
coverage of the deals. However, we believe that this can only explain part of the differences. 
                                                           
3 We add the single investment by the Venezuelan SWF to the totals for the Middle East, given 
the petroleum-driven nature of that economy. 14 
 
More important, we believe, are the differences in fund sizes and the willingness to engage in 
direct investments. For example, the average Asian and Middle Eastern funds have $132B and 
$124B under management, respectively, and are substantially larger than the average Western 
fund ($40B). 
 
While the sample consists of transactions between the years 1984 and 2007, more than 
97%  of  the  transactions  are  after  1991.  While  both  the  Asian  and  Middle  Eastern  funds’ 
investments  go  back  to  the  mid  1980s,  the  Western  funds’  investments  are  more  recent, 
beginning around 2003. Panels C and D show that the vast majority of direct investments of 
Asian funds are in Asia itself (75.7%), but only 37.4% of the investments are made in the actual 
home nation of the fund. Outside of the region, the Asian funds tend to invest in Europe and 
North America. In contrast, Middle Eastern funds invest mostly outside of their region (only 
16.5% of investments are at the same region and only 9% of investments are made in the home 
country).  Most  of  the  investments  of  the  Middle  Eastern  funds  are  made  in  Europe,  North 
America,  and Australia (61.7%). Finally, all of the investments of the  Western funds in the 
sample  are  made in  the Western  region,  with  94% of the investments in  the home country. 
However,  we  should  highlight  that  the  actual  number  of  direct  investments  undertaken  by 
Western funds is significantly smaller than Asian and Mid-East ones. 
 
We  find  that  the  average  transaction  size  is  $351  million,  but  there  is  substantial 
heterogeneity between the funds. Middle Eastern funds, on average, have the largest deals, with 
an average of $604 million, while Western funds have the smallest average deal size with only 
$97 million per transaction. Similarly, the average acquisition stake of sovereign wealth funds is 15 
 
substantial (56.59%). Parallel to above, the average stake of Middle Eastern funds is much larger 
(62.2%) than in the Western funds (25.7%), with Asia in between the two.  
 
Panel F shows that the average P/E level in the industry-country-year of the target of a 
SWF transaction is 25.6. The Asian funds invest in industries with the highest P/E levels of 26.2, 
while  the  Western  funds’  investments  have  the  lowest  industry  P/Es.  If  we  measure  the 
performance  of  investments  with  the  change  in  industry-country  P/Es  in  the  year  after  the 
investment, Western funds fare best, with an average change of +1.2 following investments, 
while the Middle Eastern and Asian have average shifts in P/Es of -1.21 and -1.17, respectively. 
For the approximately 20% of the transactions where an equity security was publicly traded, we 
also examine the market-adjusted returns in the six months after the transaction (see the detailed 
description below). Here, the pattern appears to go the other way, with the poorest performance 
by the Western SWFs’ investments. 
  
The last panel of Table 1 reports variables that capture the governance structure of the 
funds.  Recall  that  for  each  fund,  we  develop  indicator  variables  for  whether  politicians  are 
involved in the board and for whether the fund relies on external managers. About 24% of the 
funds have politicians involved in the fund and 28% of the funds rely on outside managers. We 
see that both  funds with politicians and external managers tend to make larger investments. 
Interestingly, when politicians are involved, funds invest more in the home country (44% of the 
deals  in  the  sample),  relative  to  funds  without  politicians  involved  (only  31%  of  the 
transactions).  Funds  with  external  managers  involved  invest  less  in  the  home  country  (8%) 
relative to 36% for funds that do not rely on external managers. 16 
 
 
We now analyze whether the characteristics of the SWFs are associated with differences 
in their investment strategies. The main dimensions of SWFs that we investigate are:  
1.  the geographic region of the funds, that is, differences across SWFs in the Asian, Middle 
Eastern, and Western groups, and  
2.  the governance structure of funds, i.e., whether the SWF relies on external managers for 
investment advice and whether politicians are involved in the fund.  
We will analyze investment strategies of SWFs based on their propensity to invest at home, the 
industry-country P/E levels at the time of the investments, the subsequent changes in the P/E 
ratios, and the size of the acquisition stakes of their investments.  
 
The unit of observation in our analysis is at the transaction level (that is, for a specific 
SWF and target), with standard errors at clustered at the level of the nation in which the fund is 
based.    In  many  regressions,  we  control  for  the  year  that  the  investment  is  made  and  the 
sovereign  wealth  fund  making  the  investment.    In  most  specifications,  we  use  weighted 
regressions, with where each observation weighted by the transaction size (transaction sizes are 
all expressed in 2000 U.S. dollars). Since we only have sizes for 67% of our transactions, we 
impute missing weights by constructing the fitted values from a regression of deal sizes on fixed 
effects for the investment year, target industry, target region, and fund. After adding imputed 
observations, we winsorize the deal size variable at the 5% and 95% level, in order to reduce the 
impact of extreme observations.
4 
 
                                                           
4 We report unweighted regressions in the Appendix. 17 
 
Propensity to invest at home 
In order to analyze how funds vary in their allocation of investments between the home 
nation and outside, we estimate a weighted probit model where the dependent variable is a home 
investment dummy. This dummy variable is one if the target investment is made within the home 
nation of the SWF and zero otherwise.  
 
In  Table  2,  column  (1),  we  regress  the  home  dummy  on  indicator  variables  for  the 
geographic location of the SWF (Asian, Middle Eastern, and Western), controlling for the home 
country’s gross domestic product (expressed using the logarithm of GDP, again in 2000 U.S. 
dollars) and GDP growth in the calendar year prior to the year of the investment. The Western 
group is omitted from the set of geographic dummies. We find that Asian and Middle Eastern 
funds are significantly less likely to invest at home (by 31.4% and 37.4%, respectively) relative 
to  Western  funds.  This  result  continues  to  holds  when  controlling  for  year  fixed  effects  in 
column (2). This result might not be too surprising, since SWFs in Asia and the Middle East are 
very large relative to the size of the local economies, which is different from the situation for 
Western  SWFs.  So  one  could  conjecture  that  Asian  and  Middle  Eastern  funds  are  almost 
mechanically forced to invest outside their home nations. 
 
To get  a better understanding of the decision to invest  in  the  home nation  or invest 
outside, we look at how the allocation of capital by SWFs responds to the pricing levels at home 
and abroad. As noted above, in case of an outside investment, the Outside P/E level is the P/E 
ratio in the target country in the year of the investment. In cases of a home investment, Outside 
P/E is equal to the average (weighted by total transaction amounts) P/E ratio in the year of 18 
 
investment of all other countries in which investments were made by SWFs during the entire 
period analyzed.  
 
The  results  in  column  (3)  show  that  the  Home  P/E  level  significantly  affects  the 
likelihood of investing at home, but in a manner that may be puzzling. SWFs are more likely to 
invest at home when prices there are relatively higher. The magnitude of this effect is substantial: 
an increase of one standard deviation of Home P/E increases the likelihood of investing at home 
by  6.69%.  Similarly,  higher  P/E  levels  in  the  other  countries  are  correlated  with  a  lower 
propensity to invest at home. An increase in one standard deviation of Outside P/E decreases the 
likelihood  of  investing  at  home  by  3.11%.  If  we  add  year  fixed  effects  in  column  (4),  the 
coefficient on Home P/E is still positive, but much smaller and insignificant.  The coefficient on 
the Outside P/E becomes significant at 1% level and the magnitude is larger. Finally, the results 
hold even when we add group dummies in columns (5) and (6). We verify that the results hold 
with equally weighted regressions in the appendix. 
 
The cross-sectional results suggest that SWFs invest less at home if their local equity 
markets have relatively low P/E levels. One possible explanation for this pattern is that SWFs 
shun low-valued local markets because these financial markets are not as well developed. But 
this hypothesis has difficulty explaining away the fact that the propensity to invest at abroad 
increases as the pricing level in foreign markets rises. Rather, it appears more consistent with a 
second explanation: the SWFs tend to ―trend chase,‖ that is, to gravitate to markets where equity 
values are already high. 
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The determinants of industry P/E levels, performance, and acquisition stake 
In  a second step, we examine whether there are significant differences  in investment 
strategies across funds. More specifically, we analyze whether funds vary in their propensity to 
time industry valuation cycles (measured as industry-nation P/E levels at the time of investment 
and the change in P/Es in the year after the investment).  
 
Industry P/E levels – In Table 3, we focus on the industry-nation P/E in the sector and 
year of the transaction as the dependent variable. In column (1), we estimate a weighted ordinary 
least  squares  (OLS)  regression  of  the  mean  P/E  ratio  on  the  dummy  denoting  whether  the 
investment is in the home country. Standard errors are again clustered at the level of the country 
of  the  SWF.  We  find  a  large  negative  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  on  the  home 
investment  dummy  (-5.97),  with  a  standard  error  of  2.6.  While  Table  2  showed  that  home 
investments by SWFs are more likely when domestic P/E ratios are relatively higher, domestic 
markets are still cheaper. In column (2), we see that this result is unchanged if we add dummies 
for the different regions in which the SWF is based (Asia and Middle East, with the West again 
serving as the reference group).  The coefficients on the indicators for Asian and Middle Eastern 
groups are not significant and close to zero.   
 
In column (3), we add interaction terms between the home investment dummies and the 
group indicators. These interactions allow us to explore whether the negative home investment 
effects varies across the groups of SWFs. We see that the home investment dummy now turns 
positive and significant. This implies that SWFs in the Western group choose industries with 
higher P/E ratios when investing at home, while both Asian and Middle Eastern funds choose 20 
 
investments with substantially lower P/E ratios at home (the coefficients on the interaction terms 
are -6.8 and -8.5, respectively). We also see that the direct effect of Asia and ME is now positive, 
which suggests that these funds are investing in targets with higher industry P/E ratios when 
going abroad. These results are also significant when we substitute fund fixed effects for group 
dummies in column (4). 
 
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we add dummy variables for the region of the target 
investments, in order to control for overall valuation levels in each region. We see in column (5) 
that the coefficient on the interaction between home investment and Asian group does not change 
when we include the target controls, suggesting that Asian funds investing at home do so at a 
lower  industry  P/Es  than  other  sovereign  funds  who  invest  in  Asia.  This  distinction  is  less 
significant  for  the  Middle  Eastern  funds:  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  between  home 
investment  and  Mid-East  groups  drops  by  almost  80%  once  we  add  the  target  controls.  In 
column (6), we repeat the same regression but add year fixed effects. The results are unchanged 
from column (5).  These results are even more significant in the equally weighted regressions.  
 
Overall these results suggest that funds from different regions (Asian, Middle Eastern, 
and Western) do not vary significantly in the average P/E levels of the sectors in which they 
invest. However, there is a sharp distinction when looking at domestic versus outside deals. On 
average, funds invest at significantly lower P/E levels when investing at home and higher P/E 
levels outside. But this result is mainly driven by Asian and Middle Eastern funds, while the 
opposite holds for Western funds. 
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By  themselves,  these  results  could  be  consistent  with  two  separate  and  diametrically 
opposed interpretations. First, SWFs might have lower P/E ratios in their home investments since 
they have better information about these markets and thus are able to invest at more favorable 
valuations. This interpretation fundamentally relies on the belief that it is possible to time market 
cycles.  A  second,  alternative  explanation  relies  on  the  assertion  that  P/E  levels  are  true 
reflections of the investment opportunities of firms. Under that assumption, lower P/E levels at 
home would mean that SWFs are willing to invest in firms with lower investment opportunities 
in their home country.  
 
To  shed  some  light  on  these  two  competing  interpretations,  we  now  look  at  the 
performance  of  equities  in  the  industry  and  country  in  the  year  after  the  deal.  If  the  first 
interpretation is true, we should see Asian and Mid-East SWFs outperform at home, while the 
opposite would hold under the second explanation.  
 
Performance – Table 4 is structured to be parallel to Table 3, but now with the change in 
mean P/E ratio of firms in that country and industry in the year following the investment as the 
dependent variable. In column (1), we regress the change in the industry-country P/E ratio in the 
year after the investment on a dummy for home investments. We find that the home investment 
dummy is negative but insignificant. When adding indicator variables for Asian and Middle 
Eastern  groups in  column  (2),  we see that the coefficient  on the home investment  does  not 
change.  The coefficient on  Mid-East  groups is  negative  and  significant, which  suggests  that 
overall these groups do not seem to be able to time industry trends.  
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In  column  (3),  we  now  add  interaction  terms  between  group  and  home  investments. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction terms for both Asian and Middle Eastern groups 
are negative and economically important, but only significant for the case of Asia. However, the 
direct group effects for the Mid-East and Asia are now positive and significant. Similarly, the 
coefficient on the home investment variable, which captures the change in industry P/E of the 
Western groups’ home investments, is significantly positive. In column (4), we again substitute 
group dummies with fund fixed effects and see that the signs of the interaction terms remain 
unchanged  but  the  significance  is  higher:  domestic  investments  by  both  Asian  and  Middle 
Eastern groups underperform their other transactions. In columns (5) and (6), we add dummies 
for the target region and the main results are unchanged.  The results described here also hold in 
unweighted regressions, although some of the interaction terms are less significant. 
 
The results in Table 4 suggest that Asian groups and, to a somewhat reduced extent, 
Middle Eastern SWFs see the industry P/E ratios of their home investments drop in the year after 
the  investment,  while  they  experience  a  positive  change  one  year  out  for  their  investments 
abroad. In contrast, Western groups see a more positive change in industry P/E one year out in 
their home investments relative to the ones abroad. These results suggest that while Asian and 
Middle  Eastern  SWFs  invest  in  lower  P/E  industries  at  home,  they  do  not  seem  to  have  a 
differential ability to time these industry trends, since the ex post change in the P/E ratios in the 
year after the investment is negative. This finding might suggest that the lower P/E investments 
at home for Asian and Middle Eastern groups is a reflection of generally lower prospects for 
local firms, rather than informational advantages at home. 
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We also undertake a robustness check of the performance regressions, by examining the 
returns of the subset of firms that were publicly traded at the time of the SWF investment. We 
search the Datastream database for all target companies that were publicly traded, and extract 
their monthly returns. We determine the benchmark returns for the stock exchanges in which the 
target  companies  were  traded  and  extract  those  returns  as  well.  We  compute  cumulative 
abnormal returns relative to the benchmark in the six months after the transaction, which leads to 
a considerably larger coverage than one-year returns (many of the 2007 investments did not have 
one year of performance data due to reporting delays).  
 
We  estimate  in  Tables  5  and  A-5  weighted  and  unweighted  ordinary  least  squares 
regressions similar to those in Table 4 and A-4, but now with the difference between the return 
of  the  target  in  the  six  months  after  the  transaction  and  the  return  of  the  corresponding 
benchmark over the same period as the dependent variable.  We use 538 observations in these 
estimations. We find once again that in the basic regressions that the home investment dummy 
has a significantly negative coefficient. When we add interactions between the home dummy and 
the group location, we find the home dummy becomes significantly positive. The interactions 
between the dummy variables for Asian and Middle Eastern groups and home investments are 
again negative. The interaction with the Asian groups is significant across all the specifications 
that we estimate. The significance of the interaction with the Mid-East groups falls, however, 
when  we  add  controls  for  the  location  of  the  target.  While  the  sample  of  publicly  traded 
transactions is considerably smaller, the similarity to the results in Table 4 is reassuring.  
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 Acquisition stake – Finally in Table 6, we explore how the size of the acquisition stakes 
varies between groups. We use equally weighted regressions here, since weighting based on deal 
sizes will bias our results. Again, the set-up of the table is parallel to the specifications in Tables 
3 and 4. Column (1) shows that there is no significant difference in the size of acquisition stakes 
between  home  or  outside  investments.  However,  columns  (2)  and  (3)  show  that  Asian  and 
Middle Eastern funds tend to acquire significantly bigger stakes in their target companies than 
Western funds. We see that Asian funds acquire approximately 30% larger stakes in their targets 
companies relative to Western funds, and Middle Eastern funds acquire 37% larger stakes. 
 
In column (4) we add target region dummies. Interestingly, funds acquire significantly 
smaller stakes in Asian countries relative to Western countries (23% smaller stakes in target 
companies). This is also true with respect to Middle Eastern target investments, although with a 
smaller magnitude. This effect also holds in column (5), when we substitute group dummies with 
fund fixed effects, although the Mid-East target variable is no longer significant. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that, when controlling for target regions, the home investment dummy turns 
positive and significant at the 1% level.  
 
Governance structure and the propensity to invest at home 
We now turn to analyzing whether the variations in governance structures across funds—
that is, whether politicians or/and external managers are involved in investment decisions—are 
associated with differences in the investment behavior of SWFs.  
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In Table 7, we look at the correlation between the likelihood of allocating capital at home 
or abroad and the involvement of politicians and external managers. As in Table 2, we estimate a 
weighted probit model and regress a home investment dummy on the same covariates, but add 
dummies for politicians’ involvement and reliance on external managers. Column (1) shows a 
stark  difference  between  SWFs  where  politicians  and  external  managers  are  involved  in 
investment choices and those where they are not. Funds where politicians are involved show a 
36% higher likelihood of investing at home. In contrast, funds where external managers are 
involved have a significantly lower propensity to invest at home (a decrease of 26%). These 
results are very robust to adding the usual covariates we included before, as can be seen in 
columns (2) through (8).  Note that the results reported in Table 2 remained unchanged after the 
addition of dummy variables for the involvement of politicians and external managers. These 
results are also unchanged when we estimate non-weighted regressions.   
 
Governance and industry P/E levels, performance, and acquisition stake 
Industry P/E levels. In Table 8, we investigate whether there are significant differences in 
the industry-country P/E levels of investments where politicians and/or external managers are 
involved  in  the  fund.  In  column  (1),  we  regress  P/E  levels  on  dummies  for  politicians  and 
external managers. We find that coefficient on the politician dummy is positive, and negative for 
the external managers one. But the results are insignificant. The same results hold when we add 
group dummies in column (2).  
 
However, when we add a control for home investments in column (3), the estimated 
effects for external managers and politicians become significant at the 1% level. These effects 26 
 
are also economically meaningful: funds where politicians are involved make investments whose 
P/E levels are 4.5 higher; while funds with external managers have on average a P/E level 5.0 
lower. In column (4), we see that these results also hold when controlling for the region in which 
the target is located. The inclusion of the home dummy is important because, as we saw in Table 
7, funds with politicians involved tend to favor home investments (which have lower P/Es). Once 
we control for the investment mixture, we see that funds involving external managers tend to 
invest in lower P/E sectors, while politician-influenced ones favor higher P/E ones.
5  
 
Performance. To disentangle the possible differences between the investment strategies 
of funds involving politicians and external managers, we also look in Table 8 at the change in 
P/E ratios one year out. Column (5) shows that the estimated coefficient for external managers is 
positive  and  significant  (2.6).  Meanwhile,  the  relationship  between  subsequent  changes  in 
industry P/E and involvement of politicians in the fund is the opposite: the estimated coefficient 
on the politicians variable is -3.9, with a standard error of 0.6. These results are robust to the 
inclusion  of  group  dummies,  home  investment  dummies,  and  target  region  dummies,  as 
demonstrated  in  columns  (6)  through  (8).    In  the  unweighted  regressions,  the  results  for 
politicians  are  unchanged,  but  the  coefficients  on  the  external  managers  variable  are  not 
significant.  Overall, the results suggest that investments by external manager-influenced funds 
are associated a more positive change in industry P/E in the year after the deal, while in funds 
where politicians are involved, the trend goes the other way. 
 
                                                           
5However, one should note that these results are not robust to  the estimation of unweighted 
regressions, which suggest that these findings are driven by larger acquisitions. 
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It is ultimately difficult to know whether these discrepancies in performance are a result 
of differences in the sophistication of the politician- versus external manager-influenced funds, 
or  whether  funds  where  politicians  are  involved  face  more  pressures  to  direct  capital  to 
investments where the social returns are likely to be higher (but the private ones lower). It is 
somewhat challenging, however, to reconcile the second hypothesis with the results in Table 2. If 
politicians  are  directing  funds  to  make  investments  in  troubled  local  companies,  we  would 
anticipate that these investments would accelerate at the times when they were performing the 
worst: that is, when the P/E of local firms in the same sector was particularly low. Instead, the 
opposite pattern appears.  
 
Acquisition stakes. In Table 9, the dependent variable is the acquisition stake. As in Table 
6, we estimate an unweighted OLS regression. As is clear from column (1), the involvement of 
external managers (again, recall this is recorded at the fund level as of 2008) leads to smaller 
acquisitions. The coefficient on the external managers’ dummy is -0.13, and is significant at the 
1% level. The impact of politicians on the size of acquisition stake is much weaker. While it is 
still  significant  in  column  (1),  its  magnitude  is  substantially  lower  (-0.03).  Moreover,  the 
coefficient  on  the  politician  variable  is  not  significant  in  the  subsequent  specifications.  The 
impact  of  external  managers  on  the  acquisition  stake  remains  economically  and  statistically 
significant  when  we  include  group  dummies,  a  home  investment  dummy,  and  target  region 
controls.  
 
5. Conclusions 28 
 
This paper documents a number of interesting differences in the investment strategies 
across sovereign wealth funds and their relationship to the funds’ organizational structures. We 
analyze the direct private equity investments of SWFs, since we believe that due to the lower 
degree of efficiency in these markets, differences in strategies will be more pronounced here. 
Moreover,  it  is  one  of  the  few  dimensions  of  SWF  investments  on  which  we  can  obtain 
information. 
 
 Overall  we  find  several  patterns  when  comparing  investments  at  home  and  abroad. 
SWFs seem to engage in a form of trend chasing, since they are more likely to invest at home 
when domestic equity prices are higher, and invest abroad when foreign prices are higher. Funds 
see the industry P/E ratios of their home investments drop in the year after the investment, while 
they have a positive change in the year after their investments abroad.  
 
SWFs where politicians are involved have a much greater likelihood of investing at home 
than  those  where  external  managers  are  involved.  At  the  same  time,  SWFs  with  external 
managers tend to invest in lower P/E industries, which see an increase in the P/E ratios in the 
year after the investment. By way of contrast, funds with politicians involved invest in higher 
P/E industries, which have a negative valuation change in the year after the investment. 
 
Taken  as  a  whole,  our  results  lend  support  to  the  idea  that  high  levels  of  home 
investments by SWFs, particularly those with the active involvement of political leaders, are 
associated  with  trend  chasing  and  worse  performance.  This  could  be  an  outcome  of  less 
sophisticated  decision  structures  within  these  funds  or  outright  distortions  in  the  investment 29 
 
process due to political or agency problems. This interpretation is also supported by our finding 
that politician-influenced funds invest in the highest P/E industries.  
 
While these results are only suggestive, given the preliminary nature of the data, they 
raise a number of important questions about the investment decisions and management structure 
of SWFs. A logical extension of this analysis would be to investigate the strategies of SWFs 
across a wider set of asset classes. Such an analysis, however, would be challenging given the 
opacity of many of these funds.  More generally, we believe that much interesting work remains 
to be done in understanding the underlying investment objectives of SWFs, their investment 
strategies, and organizational differences, as well as the constraints they face due to internal and 
external pressures. For example, many reports suggest that SWFs are often employed to further 
the geopolitical and strategic economic interests of their governments. A recent example is the 
emphasis of Singaporean SWFs on investing into India and China, which has been interpreted as 
forging strategic ties with the city-state’s larger and more powerful neighbors. In other cases, 
political considerations have led to the abandonment of prescient investment strategies, as when 
the Norway’s Government Pension Fund caused an uproar in 2006 by shorting the shares of 
Icelandic  banks.  Thus,  SWFs  present  an  ideal  object  of  investigation  to  understand  the 
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Appendix: Discussion of Supplemental Analyses 
 
We also undertake a variety of supplemental tests to explore the robustness of the results. 
In Table A-1, we conduct simple weighted mean tests. As noted earlier, SWFs commonly invest 
in private entities. Therefore we use industry price-earnings ratios in target countries to measure 
performance. For each target company, we calculate the weighted P/E ratio of firms in the same 
industry and country in the year in which the transaction was made. Performance is measured by 
the change in the weighted mean of the P/E ratio in the year following the transaction. We 
eliminated  the  small  number  of  transactions  in  target  countries  in  Central  America,  South 
America, and Africa.  
 
First, we compare groups’ investments across different regions. Panel A.1 demonstrates 
that there is significant heterogeneity between the groups in terms of the mean industry-country 
P/E ratios. The Asian funds’ weighted average of P/E ratio level is the highest at 25, relative to 
23.48 for Middle Eastern funds and 19.96 for Western funds. Note that the differences between 
the  reported  averages  in  Table  A-1  with  the  summary  statistics  in  Table  1  are  a  result  of 
weighting  transactions  by  deal  sizes.    Asian  funds  invest  in  higher  P/E  level  industries. 
Moreover, Asian funds, similar to Middle Eastern funds, invest in  sectors with substantially 
lower P/E ratios in the Middle Eastern region and higher P/E ratios in Western targets.  
 
When calculating performance as weighted averages, we see in panel A.2 that funds in 
general  face  sharp  drops  in  the  year  following  investments.  This  is  especially  true  for 
investments in Middle East targets (the  one-year change in industry P/E in  the Middle East 32 
 
region  is  -4.1). We see that the Asian funds perform  better than the  Middle Eastern  group, 
although the differences are not significantly better in a specific region. There are no significant 
differences between the performance of Asian and Western funds. However, in the non-weighted 
mean tests (not reported here), the Western funds outperform the Asian funds. This suggests that 
the Western funds are especially successful at selecting small investments.  
 
We then consider the investment selection and performance of funds at home versus 
abroad. As we see in panel B.1, the three groups differ significantly in terms of the choice to 
invest at home. While 94% of the Western funds’ investments are in their home country, only 
9% of the investments of Middle Eastern funds are in  the home country. The Asian funds’ 
investments are somewhere in the middle, with 37% of investments made at home.  Despite 
these differences, the P/E levels of industries selected for investment at home by Middle Eastern 
and Western funds are not significantly different. However, the Asian funds seem to invest at 
home at significantly higher P/E ratios relative to the other groups. When investing abroad, the 
Asian funds invest at the highest P/E ratio (25.9, on average) relative to 23.9 of the Middle 
Eastern funds. These are significantly different. Interestingly, there are substantial differences 
between the P/E levels funds choose to invest at abroad versus at home. Both Asian funds and 
Middle Eastern funds invest in industries with significantly higher P/E ratios when investing 
abroad, while Western funds invest in substantially lower P/E sectors abroad.  
 
In terms of performance of investments at home versus abroad, in panel B.2 it is evident 
that  Western  funds  significantly  outperform  the  Asian  and  Middle  Eastern  funds  when  we 
consider  performance  at  home.  There  are  no  significant  differences  between  the  Asian  and 33 
 
Middle Eastern investments at home. The difference is substantial when we explore investments 
abroad. The Asian funds significantly outperform both the Middle Eastern and Western funds 
when investing abroad. Finally, Asian and Middle Eastern funds perform better abroad relative 
to their performance at home, while the Western funds perform substantially better at home.  
 
In panel C, we consider the impact of politicians’ involvement in the fund or a reliance 
on  external  managers.  Interestingly, it seems  that the main  impact  of external  managers or 
politicians in terms of investment selection is on the choice of whether to invest at home. The 
involvement of politicians increases the likelihood of investing at home: 44% of transactions are 
made  at  home  (relative  to  31%  for  funds  without  politician  involvement).  However,  when 
external managers are involved, only 8% of transactions are made at home (relative to an average 
of 36% to funds without external manager involvement). Finally, neither the involvement of 
politicians nor that of external managers seems to have a substantial impact on the selection of 
industries’ P/E levels. However, funds with politicians involved perform worse than other funds.  
 
Tables A-2 through A-5, A-7, and A-8 repeat the regressions reported in the text, but now 
using unweighted data. (Because Tables 6 and 9 use unweighted data, variants of these tables are 
not presented.) The results are largely the same. When there are significant deviations between 
the unweighted and weighted data, we note these in the body of the paper. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Groups                
  








politicians          
(%) 
2008 reported 
size          
(BN$) 
Asia group  7  2046  42.85  57  132.7 
Middle East group  15  532  13.33  13.33  124.76 
Western group  7  84  42.85  14  40.874 
 
              
Panel B: Transactions by Year and Group                                        
 
1984-1990  1991-1992  1993-1994  1995-1996  1997-1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  All Years 
Asia group  41  39  85  123  151  143  168  117  114  138  168  197  229  332  2045 
Middle East group  26  21  18  22  24  17  25  9  17  17  15  46  73  203  533 
Western group  1  0  1  2  3  1  0  2  4  9  15  14  17  15  84 
Overall  67  60  104  147  179  161  193  128  135  164  198  257  319  550  2662 
 
Panel C: Transactions by Target Region and Group 






Africa  Australia  All Regions 
Asia group  1505  32  159  194  6  4  4  141  2045 
Middle East group  95  87  224  78  2  8  12  27  533 
Western group  0  0  4  2  0  0  0  78  84 









Panel D: number of transactions by Home/Region Investments 
  
All Transactions 
Home   
Investments      
(%) 
Region, not 










 Asia group  2045  37.4  35.8  75.7  24.1  8.6 
Middle East group  533  9.0  7.5  16.5  61.7  12.9 
Western group  84  94.0  0.0  94.0  100.0  2.4 
Overall  2662  33.5  29.3  62.8  34.1  9.3 
 
 
                 
















Finance, Insurance,       






Asia group  7  38  62  320  445  35  30  671  417  8  2033 
Middle East group  0  8  16  69  141  5  10  179  102  0  530 
Western group  1  5  2  24  16  3  1  21  10  0  83 
Overall  8  51  80  413  602  43  41  871  529  8  2646 
 










N  Mean  Std. Dev 
 
N  Mean  Std. Dev 
 
N  Mean  Std. Dev 
 
N  Mean  Std. Dev 
Acquisition Stake (%)  1998  56.59  39.01 
 
1542  56.15  38.47 
 
405  62.19  39.78 
 
51  25.66  33.96 
Deal Size ($MM)  1752  351.39  1846.92 
 
1397  305.65  1928.67 
 
304  604.31  1574.89 
 
51  96.66  239.82 
Home Investment (0/1)  2662  0.34  0.47 
 
2045  0.37  0.48 
 
533  0.09  0.29 
 
84  0.94  0.24 
Region (not home) Investment (0/1)  2662  0.29  0.46 
 
2045  0.36  0.48 
 
533  0.08  0.26 
 
84  0.00  0.00 
Target Industry P/E Ratio  2642  25.60  13.48 
 
2034  26.22  13.77 
 
524  23.94  12.93 
 
84  21.03  6.20 
Target Industry P/E Ratio -1 year change  2632  -1.17  11.19 
 
2026  -1.21  11.44 
 
522  -1.38  10.78 
 
84  1.17  6.31 
Target market-adjusted 6 months return   543  0.06  0.49 
 
388  0.07  0.50 
 
111  0.06  0.49 
 






Panel  G:  Politicians and External managers                         
 
Politicians Involved     No politicians Involved     External managers reliance     No external managers reliance 
 
N  Mean  Std. Dev 
 
N  Mean  Std. Dev 
 
N  Mean  Std. Dev 
 
N  Mean  Std. Dev 
Acquisition Stake (%)  366  49.16  39.19 
 
1625  58.35  38.79 
 
203  42.19  40.28 
 
1788  58.31  38.54 
Deal Size ($MM)  378  705.71  3554.14 
 
1367  250.20  912.45 
 
219  735.92  2567.93 
 
1526  293.33  1715.10 
Home Investment (0/1)  508  0.44  0.50 
 
2146  0.31  0.46 
 
275  0.08  0.27 
 
2379  0.36  0.48 
Region (not home) Investment (0/1)  508  0.31  0.46 
 
2146  0.29  0.45 
 
275  0.43  0.50 
 
2379  0.28  0.45 
Target Industry P/E Ratio  506  25.29  13.07 
 
2128  25.70  13.59 
 
272  26.00  13.87 
 
2362  25.57  13.44 
Target Industry P/E Ratio -1 year  change  502  -2.62  11.17 
 
2122  -0.82  11.18 
 
269  -2.00  12.19 
 














The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. 
The dependent variable is a dummy denoting whether the investment target was based in the same nation as the SWF. The variables 
Orig log(GDP) and Orig GDP growth represent the logarithm of the GDP in the year of the investment and the growth of the GDP in 
the calendar year prior to the investment in the SWF’s home country. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 
when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. The Home P/E variable is the country-level P/E ratio of home country. The Outside 
P/E variable is equal to the target country P/E ratio if investment is not in the SWF’s home nation. If investment is at home, Outside 
P/E is equal to the average (weighted by the total transaction sizes of the SWF deals in the sample) P/E ratios of all other countries in 
which investments were made by SWFs. The estimation method is a weighted probit model, using as weights winsorized transaction 
sizes (converted to 2000 U.S. dollars). The displayed coefficients are marginal effects. Robust standard errors, allowing for data 
clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only 
includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
Dependent Variable : Home Dummy                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Orig log(GDP)  0.058*  0.092***  0.095***  0.125***  0.060**  0.098*** 
 
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.033) 
Orig GDP growth  -0.004  -0.004  -0.015**  -0.030**  -0.007**  -0.012 
 
(0.004)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.017) 
Group ASIA   -0.314***  -0.329*** 
   
-0.307***  -0.272** 
 
(0.063)  (0.099) 
   
(0.068)  (0.118) 
Group ME   -0.374***  -0.333*** 
   
-0.333***  -0.291*** 
 
(0.069)  (0.064) 
   
(0.072)  (0.078) 
Home P/E  
   
0.009***  0.006  0.006**  0.001 
 
   
(0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Outside  P/E 
   
-0.006**  -0.008***  -0.005*  -0.007** 
 
   
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
year dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.091  0.131  0.07  0.124  0.097  0.135 
N  2626  2558  2557  2515  2557  2515 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 












The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. 
The dependent variable is the weighted (by firm value) average of the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry, country and 
year of the transaction. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is based in the same country as the 
SWF. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. Target Asia and 
Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or Middle East. The estimation method is a 
weighted ordinary least squares  model,  using as weights winsorized transaction  sizes (converted to 2000  U.S. dollars). Robust 
standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When year 
dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
 
Dependent Variable : Industry P/E Levels                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Home Investment  -5.975**  -5.064*  1.851***  1.965***  2.048***  2.260*** 
 
(2.595)  (2.592)  (0.556)  (0.381)  (0.535)  (0.391) 
Group ASIA 
 




   










   




Home X Group Asia   
 
-6.813*  -8.383**  -7.435**  -8.937** 
   
 
(3.382)  (3.247)  (3.393)  (3.313) 
Home X Group ME 
 
 
-8.553***  -7.325**  -1.866*  -0.487 
   
 
(0.732)  (2.986)  (1.013)  (3.669) 
Target ME 
 
     
-7.478***  -7.779*** 
   
     
(1.143)  (1.276) 
Target Asia 
 
     
0.474  0.163 
   
     
(0.348)  (0.209) 
Constant  25.217***  24.907***  19.621***  25.157***  19.646***  25.678*** 
 
(0.475)  (1.890)  (0.448)  (0.363)  (0.445)  (0.375) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
fund dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.176  0.135  0.137  0.178  0.151  0.192 
N  2541  2541  2541  2541  2541  2541 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 




The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. 
The dependent variable is the change in the weighted (by firm value) average of the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry 
and country of the transaction in the year after the deal. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is 
based in the same country as the SWF.  Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or 
the Middle East. Target Asia and Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or Middle 
East. The estimation method is a weighted ordinary least squares model, using as weights winsorized transaction sizes (converted to 
2000 U.S. dollars). Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in 
parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
 
Dependent Variable : Industry P/E Change                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Home Investment  -1.925  -2.542  2.393***  2.964***  2.457***  3.039*** 
 
(1.438)  (1.613)  (0.471)  (0.238)  (0.477)  (0.228) 
Group ASIA 
 






















Home X Group Asia   
 
-5.543**  -5.175**  -6.027**  -5.683** 
 
   
(2.173)  (1.862)  (2.201)  (1.954) 
Home X Group ME 
   
-2.794  -4.432***  -1.606  -3.587*** 
 
   
(1.888)  (0.219)  (1.817)  (0.521) 
Target ME 
       
-1.279**  -0.890* 
 
       
(0.478)  (0.418) 
Target Asia 
       
0.735*  0.87 
 
       
(0.417)  (0.624) 
Constant  -4.490***  -2.549**  -6.348***  -4.528***  -6.322***  -4.740*** 
 
(0.247)  (1.168)  (0.181)  (0.239)  (0.178)  (0.295) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
fund dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.138  0.113  0.115  0.139  0.117  0.14 
N  2532  2532  2532  2532  2532  2532 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 








Table 5  
The sample consists of 538 publicly traded investments. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. The dependent 
variable  is  the  difference  between  the  return  of  the  target  in  the  six  months  after  the  transaction  and  the  return  of  the 
corresponding benchmark over the same period. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in 
Asia or the Middle East. Target Asia and Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or 
Middle East. The estimation method is a weighted ordinary least squares model, using as weights winsorized transaction sizes 
(converted to 2000 U.S. dollars). Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, 
are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 






   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Home Investment  -0.119***  -0.082*  0.584***  0.590*** 
 
(0.037)  (0.038)  (0.115)  (0.117) 
Group ASIA 
 
0.037  0.703***  0.677*** 
 
 
(0.055)  (0.111)  (0.110) 
Group ME 
 
-0.078  0.580***  0.563*** 
 
 
(0.066)  (0.114)  (0.111) 
Home X Group Asia   
 
-0.680***  -0.703*** 
 
   
(0.136)  (0.140) 
Home X Group ME 
   
-0.363**  -0.567 
 
   
(0.149)  (0.320) 
Target ME 
     
0.224 
 
     
(0.190) 
Target Asia 
     
0.04 
 
     
(0.025) 
Constant  -0.036  -0.051  -0.712***  -0.704*** 
 
(0.042)  (0.081)  (0.123)  (0.125) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
fund dummies  Yes  No  No  No 
R-squared  0.181  0.067  0.069  0.073 
N  538  538  538  538 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
           41 
 
Table 6 
The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. 
The dependent variable is the share of the target company acquired by the SWF in the transaction. Home Investment is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the target is based in the same country as the SWF. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables 
equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. Target Asia and Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the 
location of target companies is in Asia or Middle East. The estimation method is an ordinary least squares model. Robust standard 
errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are 
added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
 
Dependent Variable : Acquisition Stake             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Home Investment  -0.012 
 




(0.008)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Group ASIA 
 












(0.042)  (0.041)  (0.035) 
 
Target ME 
     
-0.098**  -0.038 
 
     
(0.039)  (0.042) 
Target Asia 
     
-0.226***  -0.237*** 
 
     
(0.013)  (0.010) 
Constant  0.553***  0.210***  0.217***  0.136***  0.677*** 
 
(0.044)  (0.054)  (0.052)  (0.043)  (0.048) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
fund dummies  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.085  0.04  0.04  0.084  0.134 
N  1923  1923  1923  1923  1923 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 






The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. The dependent variable is a dummy 
denoting whether the investment target was based in the same nation as the SWF. The variables Orig log(GDP) and Orig GDP growth represent the logarithm of the GDP in the 
year of the investment and the growth of the GDP in the calendar year prior to the investment in the SWF’s home country. The Politicians variable is a dummy equals to 1 if 
politicians are involved in the management of the fund. The External Managers variable is a dummy equals to 1 if external managers are involved in the management of the 
fund. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. The Home P/E variable is the country-level P/E ratio of home 
country. The Outside P/E variable is equal to the target country P/E ratio if investment is not in the SWF’s home nation. If investment is at home, Outside P/E is equal to the 
average (weighted by the total transaction sizes of the SWF deals in the sample) P/E ratios of all other countries in which investments were made by SWFs. The estimation 
method is a weighted probit model, using as weights winsorized transaction sizes (converted to 2000 U.S. dollars). The displayed coefficients are marginal effects. Robust 
standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only includes 
transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
Dependent variable: Home Dummy 
  
                 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Orig log(GDP)  0.046  0.069*  0.037  0.065*  -0.018  -0.001  -0.021  0.003 
 
(0.048)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.032) 
Orig GDP growth  -0.009*  -0.020*  -0.016*  -0.033***  -0.002  0  -0.006**  -0.002 
 
(0.005)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
Politicians   0.360**  0.329**  0.357**  0.323**  0.408***  0.415***  0.427***  0.422*** 
 
(0.176)  (0.163)  (0.165)  (0.150)  (0.129)  (0.134)  (0.117)  (0.127) 
External managers   -0.263***  -0.247***  -0.264***  -0.249***  -0.267***  -0.261***  -0.274***  -0.265*** 
 
(0.066)  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Group ASIA  
       
-0.542***  -0.588***  -0.547***  -0.566*** 
 
       
(0.117)  (0.124)  (0.118)  (0.127) 
Group ME  
       
-0.444***  -0.427***  -0.406***  -0.416*** 
 
       
(0.061)  (0.065)  (0.058)  (0.068) 
Home P/E  
   
0.007***  0.004 
   
0.005*  -0.002 
 
   
(0.002)  (0.003) 
   
(0.003)  (0.002) 
Outside  P/E 
   
-0.007**  -0.009*** 
   
-0.006*  -0.008** 
 
   
(0.003)  (0.003) 
   
(0.003)  (0.003) 
year dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Pseudo R-squared  0.128  0.173  0.153  0.192  0.183  0.21  0.192  0.22 
N  2618  2550  2549  2507  2618  2550  2549  2507 









The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. The dependent variables are the weighted 
(by firm value) average of the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry, country and year of the transaction and the change in the weighted (by firm value) average of 
the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry and country of the transaction in the year after the deal. The External Managers variable is a dummy equals to 1 if external 
managers are involved in the management of the fund. The Politicians variable is a dummy equals to 1 if politicians are involved in the management of the fund. Group ASIA and 
Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is based in the 
same country as the SWF. Target Asia and Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or Middle East. The estimation method is a 
weighted ordinary least squares model, using as weights winsorized transaction sizes (converted to 2000 U.S. dollars). Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the 
countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Industry P/E Levels 
  
      Industry P/E Change 
  
     
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
External managers  -2.112  -2.102  -5.023***  -4.562***  2.590***  2.884***  2.160***  2.266*** 
 
(1.733)  (1.820)  (1.201)  (1.307)  (0.341)  (0.342)  (0.599)  (0.668) 
Politicians  1.923  1.974  4.502***  4.153***  -3.977***  -4.788***  -4.168***  -4.207*** 
 
(1.811)  (1.940)  (1.271)  (1.300)  (0.549)  (0.252)  (0.404)  (0.423) 
Group ASIA 
 
2.391***  -1.639  -0.803 
 
0.936***  -0.048  -0.423 
 
 
(0.746)  (1.585)  (1.849) 
 
(0.278)  (0.745)  (0.838) 
Group ME 
 
2.707***  -1.761  -0.214 
 
-0.905*  -2.000*  -2.139* 
 
 
(0.621)  (1.739)  (2.153) 
 
(0.437)  (1.008)  (1.092) 
Home Investment 
   
-6.526***  -5.607* 
   
-1.595  -1.749 
 
   
(2.076)  (2.625) 
   
(1.209)  (1.250) 
Target Asia 
     
-0.162 
     
0.489 
 
     
(0.284) 
     
(0.419) 
Target ME 
     
-5.433*** 
     
-0.178 
 
     
(1.267) 
     
(0.916) 
Constant  24.170***  21.661***  26.756***  26.148***  -4.671***  -4.583***  -3.335***  -3.194*** 
 
(0.444)  (0.645)  (1.830)  (2.126)  (0.929)  (0.367)  (0.954)  (0.962) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.105  0.106  0.141  0.152  0.121  0.127  0.13  0.131 
N  2533  2533  2533  2533  2524  2524  2524  2494 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 44 
 
Table 9 
The sample consists of  2662 investments  by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes  transactions which were 
withdrawn or rejected. The dependent variable is the share of the target company acquired by the SWF in the 
transaction. The External Managers variable is a dummy equals to 1 if external managers are involved in the 
management  of  the  fund.  The  Politicians  variable  is  a  dummy  equals  to  1  if  politicians  are  involved  in  the 
management of the fund. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia 
or the Middle East. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is based in the same 
country  as  the  SWF.  Target  Asia  and  Target  ME  are  dummy  variables  indicating  that  the  location  of  target 
companies is in Asia or Middle East. The estimation method is an ordinary least squares model. Robust standard 
errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When 
year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquisition Stake          
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
External managers  -0.134***  -0.141***  -0.154***  -0.172*** 
 
(0.023)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.040) 
Politicians  -0.034*  -0.028  -0.019  -0.014 
 
(0.017)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
Group ASIA 
 
0.317***  0.299***  0.533*** 
 
 
(0.031)  (0.032)  (0.036) 
Group ME 
 
0.372***  0.348***  0.482*** 
 
 
(0.047)  (0.045)  (0.038) 
Home Investment 
   
-0.028*  0.056*** 
 
   
(0.014)  (0.016) 
Target Asia 
     
-0.233*** 
 
     
(0.013) 
Target ME 
     
-0.083 
 
     
(0.049) 
Constant  0.563***  0.237***  0.262***  0.180*** 
 
(0.035)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.045) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.035  0.055  0.056  0.103 
N  1916  1916  1916  1916 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 









Table A.1 – Weighted Mean Tests  
Part A : Where do funds invest? 
Panel A.1 – P/E Levels 






Overall (mean)  24.371  25.018  23.476  19.957  0.055  0.000  0.000 
Asia Targets (mean)  24.598  24.404  27.021 
 
0.353 
    ME Targets (mean)  17.853  18.002  17.814 
 
0.915 
    Western Targets (mean)  25.027  26.441  24.204  19.957  0.044  0.000  0.000 
Asia / ME (p-value)  0.000  0.000    0.002 
 
        
Asia/Western (p-value)  0.000  0.054    0.321 
 
  
    ME / Western (p-value)  0.597  0.000    0.000 
 
  
     
Panel A.2 – Performance (P/E Change) 





(p-value)  Overall (mean)  -1.410  -1.002  -2.272  -.216  0.084  0.432  0.053 
Asia Targets (mean)  -1.247  -1.141  -2.569 
 
0.559 
   
ME Targets (mean)  -4.089  -3.246  -4.317 
 
0.620 
   
Western Targets (mean)  -1.200  -.644  -1.821  -.216  0.234  0.711  0.150 
Asia / ME (p-value)  0.014  0.271  0.509 
 
        
Asia/Western (p-value)  0.949  0.597  0.761 
 
  
    ME / Western (p-value)  0.009  0.184  0.063 
 
  




Part B: How do home and international investments differ? 
Panel B.1 – P/E Levels 





(p-value)  Home Investment (%)  33.5  37.4  9.0  94.0  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Abroad (%)  66.5  62.6  91.0  6.0  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Industry P/E at home  22.023  22.795  18.387  20.245  0.015  0.017  0.308 
Industry P/E abroad  25.039  25.853  23.928  18.962  0.035  0.000  0.000 
Home/Abroad (p-value)  0.000  0.002  0.002  0.236    
     
Panel B.2 – Performance (P/E Change) 





(p-value)  Home Investment (%)  33.5  37.4  9.0  94.0  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Abroad (%)  66.5  62.6  91.0  6.0  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Industry P/E at home  -2.922  -3.210  -3.796  .869  0.701  0.000  0.004 
Industry P/E abroad  -.981  -.171  -2.139  -3.969  0.017  0.096  0.426 
Home/Abroad (p-value)  0.009  0.001  0.261  0.043    
     


















External         
(p-value) 
Home Investment (%)  0.442  0.309  0.080  0.364  0.000  0.000 
Industry P/E level  24.760  24.359  23.306  24.642  0.686  0.250 






The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. 
The dependent variable is a dummy denoting whether the investment target was based in the same nation as the SWF. The variables 
Orig log(GDP) and Orig GDP growth represent the logarithm of the GDP in the year of the investment and the growth of the GDP in 
the calendar year prior to the investment in the SWF’s home country. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 
when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. The Home P/E variable is the country-level P/E ratio of home country. The Outside 
P/E variable is equal to the target country P/E ratio if investment is not in the SWF’s home nation. If investment is at home, Outside 
P/E is equal to the average (weighted by the total transaction sizes of the SWF deals in the sample) P/E ratios of all other countries in 
which investments were made by SWFs. The estimation method is a probit model. The displayed coefficients are marginal effects. 
Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When 
year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
Dependent Variable : Home Dummy                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Orig log(GDP)  0.013  0.059  0.087  0.133**  0.017  0.07 
 
(0.048)  (0.047)  (0.060)  (0.057)  (0.041)  (0.053) 
Orig GDP growth  -0.006  -0.01  -0.020*  -0.062***  -0.011*  -0.031 
 
(0.005)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.022) 
Group ASIA   -0.622***  -0.604*** 
   
-0.604***  -0.511*** 
 
(0.093)  (0.116) 
   
(0.097)  (0.137) 
Group ME   -0.530***  -0.509*** 
   
-0.495***  -0.459*** 
 
(0.052)  (0.058) 
   
(0.055)  (0.060) 
Home P/E  
   
0.012***  0.014***  0.008***  0.004 
 
   
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Outside  P/E 
   
-0.017***  -0.017***  -0.016***  -0.017*** 
 
   
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
year dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.097  0.112  0.062  0.102  0.114  0.131 
N  2626  2558  2557  2515  2557  2515 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 














The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. 
The dependent variable is the weighted (by firm value) average of the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry, country and 
year of the transaction. Home Investment  is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is based in the same country as the 
SWF. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. Target Asia and 
Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or Middle East. The estimation method is 
an ordinary least squares model. Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, 
are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
Dependent Variable : Industry P/E Levels                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Home Investment  -5.689***  -5.959***  1.655***  4.645  1.642***  4.745 
 
(0.991)  (0.871)  (0.313)  (3.478)  (0.362)  (3.375) 
Group ASIA 
 






















Home X Group Asia 
 
-7.836***  -10.577**  -7.232***  -10.065** 
 
   
(0.794)  (3.582)  (0.899)  (3.499) 
Home X Group ME 
   
-5.905**  -8.785*  0.232  -2.578 
 
   
(2.237)  (4.664)  (2.759)  (4.909) 
Target ME 
       
-7.215***  -7.852*** 
 
       
(1.259)  (1.015) 
Target Asia 
       
-1.800***  -1.950*** 
 
       
(0.369)  (0.337) 
Constant  26.289***  27.559***  20.418***  26.038***  20.527***  27.581*** 
 
(0.714)  (1.027)  (0.769)  (0.644)  (0.853)  (0.752) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
fund dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.14  0.131  0.132  0.141  0.141  0.15 
N  2541  2541  2541  2541  2541  2541 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table A-4 
The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. 
The dependent variable is the change in the weighted (by firm value) average of the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry 
and country of the transaction in the year after the deal. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is 
based in the same country as the SWF.  Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or 
the Middle East. Target Asia and Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or Middle 
East. The estimation method is an ordinary least squares model. Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries 
in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 
1991 onward. 
Dependent Variable : Industry P/E Change                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Home Investment  -1.372***  -1.194**  1.634  2.068  1.651  2.056 
 
(0.407)  (0.429)  (1.850)  (1.275)  (1.818)  (1.253) 
Group ASIA 
 






















Home X Group Asia 
 
-2.832  -3.425**  -3.212*  -3.796*** 
 
   
(1.821)  (1.265)  (1.774)  (1.213) 
Home X Group ME 
   
-3.119  -4.076**  -2.965  -4.478** 
 
   
(2.294)  (1.408)  (2.771)  (1.809) 
Target ME 
       
0.046  0.714 
 
       
(1.293)  (0.862) 
Target Asia 
       
0.871  0.981 
 
       
(0.549)  (0.673) 
Constant  -4.970***  -2.670***  -5.311**  -5.045***  -5.331**  -5.630*** 
 
(0.292)  (0.465)  (1.894)  (0.298)  (1.864)  (0.552) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
fund dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.095  0.082  0.082  0.095  0.083  0.096 
N  2532  2532  2532  2532  2532  2532 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table A-5  
The sample consists of 538 publicly traded investments. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. The dependent 
variable  is  the  difference  between  the  return  of  the  target  in  the  six  months  after  the  transaction  and  the  return  of  the 
corresponding benchmark over the same period. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is based in the 
same country as the SWF.  Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle 
East. Target Asia and Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or Middle East. 
Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When 
year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 






   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Home Investment  -0.095***  -0.062  0.544***  0.547*** 
 
(0.025)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.049) 
Group ASIA 
 
0.037  0.632***  0.606*** 
 
 
(0.054)  (0.045)  (0.040) 
Group ME 
 
0.025  0.610***  0.594*** 
 
 
(0.070)  (0.043)  (0.026) 
Home X Group Asia   
 
-0.621***  -0.634*** 
 
   
(0.092)  (0.106) 
Home X Group ME 
   
-0.264***  -0.385 
 
   
(0.073)  (0.239) 
Target ME 
     
0.136 
 
     
(0.198) 
Target Asia 
     
0.035 
 
     
(0.065) 
Constant  0.087**  0.018  -0.572***  -0.570*** 
 
(0.037)  (0.077)  (0.032)  (0.029) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
fund dummies  Yes  No  No  No 
R-squared  0.12  0.048  0.052  0.054 
N  538  538  538  538 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 










The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. The dependent variable is a dummy 
denoting whether the investment target was based in the same nation as the SWF. The variables Orig log(GDP) and Orig GDP growth represent the logarithm of the GDP in the 
year of the investment and the growth of the GDP in the calendar year prior to the investment in the SWF’s home country. The Politicians variable is a dummy equals to 1 if 
politicians are involved in the management of the fund. The External Managers variable is a dummy equals to 1 if external managers are involved in the management of the 
fund. Group ASIA and Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. The Home P/E variable is the country-level P/E ratio of home 
country. The Outside P/E variable is equal to the target country P/E ratio if investment is not in the SWF’s home nation. If investment is at home, Outside P/E is equal to the 
average (weighted by the total transaction sizes of the SWF deals in the sample) P/E ratios of all other countries in which investments were made by SWFs. The estimation 
method is a probit model. The displayed coefficients are marginal effects. Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are 
shown in parenthesis. When year dummies are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
 
Dependent variable: Home Dummy                      
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Orig log(GDP)  0.047  0.087  0.042  0.078  -0.065  -0.040  -0.063*  -0.03 
 
(0.086)  (0.084)  (0.079)  (0.068)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.036)  (0.047) 
Orig GDP growth  -0.012*  -0.027  -0.018*  -0.059***  -0.003  0.000  -0.007***  -0.016 
 
(0.007)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.014) 
Politicians   0.348**  0.331**  0.337**  0.316**  0.398***  0.397***  0.403***  0.390*** 
 
(0.158)  (0.164)  (0.156)  (0.148)  (0.115)  (0.126)  (0.109)  (0.120) 
External managers   -0.364***  -0.355***  -0.364***  -0.354***  -0.370***  -0.371***  -0.377*** -0.373*** 
 
(0.083)  (0.076)  (0.066)  (0.057)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Group ASIA  
       
-0.771***  -0.778***  -0.754*** -0.729*** 
 
       
(0.054)  (0.059)  (0.055)  (0.078) 
Group ME  
       
-0.564***  -0.556***  -0.528*** -0.516*** 
 
       
(0.027)  (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.042) 
Home P/E  
   
0.011***  0.014*** 
   
0.007**  0.003 
 
   
(0.001)  (0.003) 
   
(0.003)  (0.003) 
Outside  P/E 
   
-0.017***  -0.017*** 
   
-0.016*** -0.017*** 
 
   
(0.002)  (0.002) 
   
(0.002)  (0.002) 
year dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Pseudo R-squared  0.089  0.117  0.125  0.159  0.169  0.179  0.186  0.197 
N  2618  2550  2549  2507  2618  2550  2549  2507 





             





The sample consists of 2662 investments by 29 Sovereign Wealth funds. It excludes transactions which were withdrawn or rejected. The dependent variables are the weighted 
(by firm value) average of the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry, country and year of the transaction and the change in the weighted (by firm value) average of 
the P/E ratios of publicly traded firms in the industry and country of the transaction in the year after the deal. The External Managers variable is a dummy equals to 1 if external 
managers are involved in the management of the fund. The Politicians variable is a dummy equals to 1 if politicians are involved in the management of the fund. Group ASIA and 
Group ME are dummy variables equal to 1 when a fund is based in Asia or the Middle East. Home Investment is a dummy variable which equals one if the target is based in the 
same country as the SWF. Target Asia and Target ME are dummy variables indicating that the location of target companies is in Asia or Middle East. The estimation method is an 
ordinary least squares model. Robust standard errors, allowing for data clustering by the countries in which the SWFs are based, are shown in parenthesis. When year dummies 
are added, the sample only includes transactions from 1991 onward. 
Dependent Variable:  Industry P/E Levels 
  
      Industry P/E Change 
  
     
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
External managers  2.131  2.418  -0.67  -0.59  1.146  1.052  0.555  0.661 
 
(2.361)  (2.339)  (1.253)  (1.186)  (0.899)  (0.893)  (1.099)  (1.170) 
Politicians  -0.986  -1.48  0.632  0.528  -2.179***  -2.009**  -1.675*  -1.701* 
 
(2.204)  (2.129)  (1.300)  (1.278)  (0.716)  (0.683)  (0.825)  (0.838) 
Group ASIA 
 
3.223***  -0.825  1.483* 
 
-1.328***  -1.970***  -2.786*** 
 
 
(0.398)  (0.598)  (0.757) 
 
(0.250)  (0.449)  (0.760) 
Group ME 
 
1.956***  -3.241***  -1.113 
 
-0.931***  -1.761***  -2.200*** 
 
 
(0.282)  (0.766)  (0.878) 
 
(0.302)  (0.404)  (0.500) 
Home Investment 
   
-6.110***  -5.113*** 
   
-0.972**  -1.258** 
 
   
(0.760)  (0.850) 
   
(0.417)  (0.501) 
Target Asia 
     
-2.012*** 
     
0.827 
 
     
(0.270) 
     
(0.609) 
Target ME 
     
-4.823*** 
     
0.014 
 
     
(1.426) 
     
(0.821) 
Constant  24.609***  21.989***  27.624***  26.790***  -4.929***  -3.802***  -2.905***  -2.641*** 
 
(1.211)  (0.714)  (0.718)  (0.860)  (0.374)  (0.397)  (0.361)  (0.334) 
year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.093  0.096  0.132  0.138  0.082  0.082  0.084  0.084 
N  2533  2533  2533  2533  2524  2524  2524  2524 
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